Quality improvement models have been applied across various levels of health systems with varying success leading to scepticisms about effectiveness. Health systems are complex, influenced by contexts and characterized by numerous interests. Thus, a shift in focus from examining whether improvement models work, to understanding why, when and where they work most effectively is essential. Nigeria introduced DIVA (Diagnose-Intervene-Verify-Adjust) as a model to strengthen decentralized PHC planning. However, implementation has been poorly sustained. This article explores the role of actors and context in implementation and sustainability of DIVA in two local government areas (LGAs) in Nigeria. We employed an integrated mixed method approach in which qualitative data was used in conjunction with quantitative to understand effects of actors and contexts on implementation outcomes. We analysed policy documents and conducted interviews with PHC managers. Then using the Model for Understanding Success in Quality (MUSIQ), we measured contextual factors affecting implementation of DIVA in the selected LGAs. The LGAs scored 117.42 and 104.67 out of 168 points on the MUSIQ scale, respectively, indicating contextual barriers exist. Both have strong DIVA team attributes, but these could not independently ensure quality implementation. Although external support accounted for the greatest contextual disparities, the utmost implementation challenges relate to subnational government leadership, management, financial and technical support. Although higher levels of government may set visionary goals for PHC, interventions are potentially skewed towards donor interests at lower (implementation) levels. Thus, subnational political will is a key determinant of quality implementation. Consequently, advocacy for responsible and accountable political governance is essential in comparable decentralized contexts.
Introduction
Quality improvement (QI), a combined and unceasing efforts of all system actors to make the changes expected to lead to better system performance (Batalden and Davidoff 2007) , has recently gained widespread use in healthcare. Its application spans across various levels of health systems even though it is more commonly employed at the clinical interphase, organizational levels or with respect to vertical programmes (Vasan et al. 2017; Eboreime et al. 2017) . However, variations in success (some fail while others succeed to varying extents), has led to scepticism about effectiveness of these methods in healthcare (Kaplan et al. 2012; Dixon-Woods and Martin 2016) . Health systems are complex, influenced by contexts and characterized by many actors and interest groups (Mburu 1994; Abimbola et al. 2014) . Thus, shifting focus from examining whether QI methods work to understanding why, when and where they work most effectively is essential to understanding implementation success of healthcare QI initiatives (Kaplan et al. 2012) . This involves examining local actors and contexts, a much argued for dimension of health policy analysis. Despite its recognition in health care analyses some 25 years ago (Walt and Gilson 1994) , it continues to require explicit attention with respect to its constituent parts-actors, content, context (Walt et al. 2008) . More recently, Embrett and Randall conclude their analysis of health equity studies by saying many appear to be focussed on advocacy rather than analysis and that the use of policy analysis theory is extremely limited. Their results further suggest that when such theories are incorporated into an analysis they are often not comprehensively employed (Embrett and Randall 2014) .
Lately, many low and middle-income countries (LMICs), particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, are restructuring their health systems towards decentralization, particularly following democratization of their polities (Eboreime et al. 2017) . This decentralized system of administration has implications on implementation of health initiatives. The aim of decentralization is to bring health services closer to the end users, particularly to improve community participation in healthcare planning and decision making in line with the Alma Ata Primary Health Care (PHC) Declaration (Gerring et al. 2007; Eboreime et al. 2017) . It is believed that a bottom-up approach to planning more effectively addresses equity and quality constraints as well as strengthening accountability mechanisms (UNICEF; MSH 2012). Consequently, the World Health Organization recommended the District Health System (DHS) to improve health system governance in decentralized LMIC contexts (Chatora and Tumusiime 2004; National Council for Health 2011; O'Connell and Sharkey 2013) . Countries have adapted models of the DHS to their own contexts (Eboreime et al. 2017) .
In order to strengthen the DHS, a QI model known as DIVA (Diagnose-Intervene-Verify-Adjust) was introduced in some sub-Saharan African countries (including Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) by UNICEF (O'Connell and Sharkey 2013; Maluka et al. 2010; Yawson et al. 2017) . The model is designed to improve health outcomes by strengthening evidenceinformed operational planning of PHC at the district level. DIVA is a four-step model in which 'Diagnose' identifies bottlenecks to programme interventions; 'Intervene' develops/implements action plans addressing the bottlenecks; while 'Verify/Adjust' monitor performance and revise plans ( Figure 1 ). DIVA is a derivative of the PlanDo-Study-Act cycle adapted to improve performance in complex macro-health systems like the DHS (IHI 2011; UNICEF; MSH 2012) . The model aims to build the capacity of district health teams to evaluate, analyse, act and be accountable for equitable service delivery (UNICEF; MSH 2012). The main aim of DIVA is to improve effective coverage of health interventions (defined as coverage of sufficient quality to make desired impact ; Tanahashi 1978 ; O'Connell and Sharkey 2013) through iterative cycles of evidence-informed health system bottleneck analysis, planning and performance improvement (UNICEF; MSH 2012; O'Connell and Sharkey 2013). Although no effectiveness study of DIVA has previously been conducted to our knowledge, case studies have demonstrated how DIVA has been useful in evidence-informed planning as well as improving financial investments in health in Ghana, Uganda, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo (O'Connell and Sharkey 2013; Baker et al. 2015; Kiwanuka Henriksson et al. 2017; Yawson et al. 2017) .
The government of Nigeria (the federal and 36 state governments) in 2012, through the National Council on Health (Nigeria's highest policy making body for health, consisting of all State Commissioners of Health and chaired by the Minister for Health; FGN 2014), approved DIVA as a model for quarterly PHC reviews. The purpose of this is to strengthen ongoing PHC revitalization efforts, particularly the integrated PHC governance policy (NPHCDA 2013a). However, implementation of PHC reviews/ DIVA has only been sustained in one state, Kaduna, due to the role of various actors in adapting the content to local context (NPHCDA 2013b). As part of a series of implementation research on DIVA, this article aims to explore the role of these actors and context in the implementation and sustainability of DIVA by comparing experiences between Nigerian local government areas (LGAs) (analogues of districts) in Kaduna state.
Nigeria's ongoing Integrated PHC Governance reforms, also called 'Primary Health Care Under One Roof (PHCUOR)' makes sub-national PHC governance, hitherto under the LGA, the responsibility of the State PHC Development Agency (SPHCDA) (NPHCDA, 2013a; Aigbiremolen et al. 2014; Eboreime et al. 2017) . This policy was introduced in 2010 by the Federal Ministry of Health through the National Primary Health Care Development Agency (NPHCDA), in response to the challenge of weak governance at the lower levels of the health system (NPHCDA 2013a). The PHCUOR reforms are hinged on the core principles of 'One Management, One Plan, One Monitoring and Evaluation System'. The PHC reviews/DIVA was introduced to strengthen PHCUOR by integrating sub-national planning of otherwise vertical PHC programmes, in line with national goals.
Materials and methods

Analytical framework
According to Walt and Gilson (1994) , implementation outcomes of health policies are products of the content, context, processes of formulation and execution, as well as the social actors involved in the processes. Policy content refers to the body of the policy and how it is expressed through its entire components such as aims, objectives, interventions, programmes, activities etc. Content has been described as 'a set of measures combined, in a particular sequence, in order to transform a real situation into a desired one' (Araú jo and Maciel 2001). Contextual factors commonly affect how policies and initiatives are implemented and have been implicated in variability in effectiveness of interventions. This dynamic relationship makes it difficult to separate interventions from their contextual environments (Buse et al. 2005; Kaplan et al. 2012; Dixon-Woods and Martin 2016) . With respect to QI initiatives, like DIVA, Kaplan et al. (2012) broadly categorized contextual factors as relating to the team working on the project, the microsystem in which they function, local QI support and capacity, the organisation in which they work, and the external environment. The effect of the context on outcomes will vary depending on how the policy or intervention is designed and implemented (Collins et al. 1999; Araú jo and Maciel 2001) . Finally, actors are the agents of policies and interventions.
They are at the centre of formulation and implementation. Generally, actors are either governmental or non-governmental. The interests, positions and power relations among actors shape the direction and processes of health policies and interventions (Walt and Gilson 1994; Araú jo and Maciel 2001; Buse et al. 2005) .
In this article, we focus on understanding how DIVA implementation is affected by actors and contextual nuances particularly at the LGA level. As relates to health policy analysis, context can either be macro (relating to systems level influences such as political and economic systems), meso (including local health system e.g. district health systems) or micro (relating to individuals and their interactions, e.g. provider-patient interphase, LGA health management teams) (Gilson, 2012) .
Study setting
Nigeria is comprised of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory, divided into 774 LGAs. Each LGA contains a number of electoral wards (totalling 9557 nationwide) which are the smallest political units in the country. Nigeria is made up of approximately 400 ethnic groups and 450 languages (Danladi 2013) . The nation's constitution created a considerable politically and fiscally decentralized system of government. The state government is the second tier of government in Nigeria, headed by an elected governor whereas the political head of the LGA is am elected chairperson. PHC governance at state level is by the SPHCDA, which is semi-autonomous organ of the state ministry of health. PHC is under the purview of LGAs while the state and federal governments are responsible for the management (administrative and financial) of secondary and tertiary health care services, respectively (FMOH 2004) .
Kaduna is 1 of the 36 states of Nigeria. Located in the NorthWest Zone of Nigeria, the state has a 2015 projected population of LGAs. As of 2012, the state had a total of 1560 health facilities out of which 1523 (98%) are PHC facilities. 1007 (66%) of PHC facilities are public while the remaining 516 (34%) are private facilities (FMOH 2012) .
Study design
An integrated mixed method approach (Creamer 2017 ) was used in this study. Qualitative data was used in conjunction with quantitative data to understand how actors interact in different contexts, and how this affected DIVA implementation outcomes. The study was carried out in four phases. First, we analysed PHC policy documents to identify policy and programme content, governance contexts and actors. Next, we assessed the level of implementation of work plans developed during the PHC reviews to address identified bottlenecks in all 23 LGAs between 2013 and 2016. Details of the bottleneck analysis and planning processes are contained in another upcoming paper. Based on the findings, we purposively selected two
LGAs (the highest and lowest performing in the period under consideration). Then, we conducted key informant interviews of LGA and state PHC managers to understand roles and experiences of various actors with DIVA implementation. Finally, using an adaptation of the Model for Understanding Success in Quality (MUSIQ) (Kaplan et al. 2012) , we compared quantitatively the contextual factors affecting implementation of DIVA in the two selected LGAs. Triangulation of all data (interviews, MUSIQ and document analysis) was done to validate inferences. Further, findings from document analysis and interviews were used to understand and explain results from MUSIQ.
Phase 1: Identifying policy/programme content, contexts and actors
We analysed the content of 10 policy documents (NPHCDA 2009 (NPHCDA , 2012a (NPHCDA , b, 2013a (NPHCDA , b, c, 2006 FMOH, 2004 FMOH, , 2010 NPHCDA et al., 2015) to identify implementation contexts, prescribed roles and responsibilities of various actors in implementing the PHC reviews. Guided by MUSIQ, we specifically sought to identify contextual factors relating to the microsystem (DIVA implementing team); the mesosystem (LGA health department in which they operate, local support and capacity for implementation); and the macrosystem (the broader organisational context) such as the LGA political governance structure and systems, and the environment external to the delivery system (including donors, civil society and higher sociopolitical influences).
The documents were identified following interviews with four national level subject matter experts (one NPHCDA director, two consultants and one UNICEF official) who were involved in the initial policy design; and from the researchers' knowledge. These documents include national PHC governance guidelines, reports of stakeholder meetings on PHC reviews and ongoing PHC revitalization initiatives, as well as national reports on initial implementation of DIVA.
Stakeholder analysis was done using a RACI (ResponsibleAccountable-Consult-Inform) Matrix (Smith and Erwin 2005) as follows:
• Responsible: Those who do the work to achieve the task.
• Accountable: The person ultimately answerable for thorough completion of the deliverable or task, and the one who delegates the work to those responsible.
• Consulted: Those whose opinions are sought, typically subject matter experts.
• Informed: Those who are kept up-to-date on progress, often only on completion of the task or deliverable; and with whom there is just one-way communication.
Identified
LGA level actors were subsequently interviewed as key informants.
Phase 2: Selecting sample Kaduna was selected for study because it is the only state still implementing DIVA. We developed and distributed a work plan assessment questionnaire (Supplementary Material S1) to all 23 LGA PHC Directors in the state. We analysed the patterns of implementation of work plans developed to address bottlenecks in all LGAs between 2013 and 2016 using Microsoft Excel (details of this process is contained in an upcoming paper). Based on this finding, LGA1 and LGA2 were selected for further comparative study having implemented the highest (78%) and lowest (8%) proportions of planned activities, respectively. Given that while all LGAs in the state have the same organizational structure, this selection process was informed by the guiding theory of this study:
differential implementation outcomes of DIVA are a function of factors relating to unique contextual environment and actors operating in each LGA.
The identities of the LGAs have been anonymised as part of confidentiality agreements with key informants.
LGA 1 has 75 PHC facilities and 2 secondary health facilities while LGA2 61 PHC facilities and 1 secondary health facility. Both LGAs are largely rural with semi-urban capitals. The capital of LGA 1, however, is more proximate to the Kaduna state capital than LGA 2 thus making it more structurally developed than that of LGA 2. Both LGAs share fundamentally the same organizational structure as all other LGAs in the state (and in Nigeria).
LGAs in Nigeria are not financially autonomous as they are funded through joint state/LGA accounts which are administered by state governments (FGN 1999; Eboreime et al. 2017 ).
Phase 3: Exploring experiences of LGA actors with DIVA implementation
In-depth interviews were conducted with available LGA DIVA team members in both LGAs and an SPHCDA Monitoring and Evaluation consultant (totalling nine respondents) to understand their experiences with implementing DIVA.
LGA DIVA team members interviewed include PHC Director (LGA 1), Monitoring and Evaluation officers (both LGAs) as well as programme coordinators for Maternal and Child Health (both LGAs), immunization (both LGAs), and malaria (LGA 2). These managers were purposively selected because they are central to implementation of DIVA at the various levels thus have detailed knowledge of the implementation processes and challenges and thus could provide in-depth and rich data which would further the understating of the context given the very few actors directly involved in DIVA implementation at the LGA level. The politically elected chairpersons for both LGAs, PHC Director for LGA 2 (Team lead) and the Malaria programme officer for LGA 1 were not available for interviews. The SPHCDA Monitoring and Evaluation consultant was interviewed because he is the only state level officer directly and actively involved with DIVA. Eight interviews were conducted face-to-face while one was conducted via phone call. Audio recorded interviews were conducted in English. Fieldnotes were also taken by an assistant. Interviews were converted into transcripts and compared with fieldnotes to ensure reliability of transcripts. Further, two researchers listened separately to audio recordings and crosschecked against transcripts and fieldnotes. Interviews were conducted between February and April, 2017.
Data analysis was conducted using a framework analytic approach. Developed by Ritchie and Spenser, framework analysis is 'a content analysis method which involves summarizing and classifying data within a thematic framework' (Ritchie and Spencer 1994; Green and Thorogood 2014) . The processes include familiarization, thematic analysis, indexing and charting. The method is ideal for generating policy and practice-oriented findings as is the case with this research (Green and Thorogood 2014) . NVIVO 11 was used in the data analysis.
We adopted the six a priori themes of MUSIQ for deductive thematic analysis (Kaplan et al. 2012) . We further identified new themes from the data set. Two researchers independently identified and categorized related data into the selected themes. A third researcher validated the categorization. All three researchers agreed on the themes and the indexing rules. Using NVIVO we created three case nodes by categorizing respondent data into 'LGA 1, LGA 2 and SPHCDA' according to the respective affiliations of respondents. These were charted against the six themes. We created summaries of the indexed data then 'cut and pasted' into the framework matrix created on NVIVO. Three researchers independently compared the data across and within codes to identify relationships, emerging characteristics and typologies.
Phase 4: Evaluating context using MUSIQ MUSIQ was developed by Kaplan et al. (2012) as a conceptual model that can be used to understand and optimise contextual factors affecting the success of QI projects. The model identifies 25 contextual factors (grouped into 6 themes) likely to influence QI success (Table 1) . Contextual factors within the microsystem (LGA health department) and those related to the QI team (in this case LGA DIVA teams) are hypothesised to directly shape QI success, whereas factors within the organization (LGA) and external environment are believed to influence success (fidelity and sustainability) indirectly (Kaplan et al. 2012) . A MS-Excel tool was developed by Kaplan et al. to measure the level of influence of these conceptual factors. Whereas the original MUSIQ tool was designed for clinical settings, we adapted the tool to our study context reflecting Nigeria's LGA structure (Supplementary Material S2). We administered the tools to available LGA health team members (each team had four representatives). We encouraged the team members to agree on responses so that scores reflect consensus. However, for questions in which consensus could not be reached were given a score of 'No consensus (n.c)'. We compared the contextual factor scores and total MUSIQ scores between the two LGAs.
NB: QI, DIVA and PHC reviews are used interchangeably in this paper. Also, given that the first phase of DIVA involves bottleneck analysis, some respondents used the term 'bottleneck analysis' in reference to DIVA during the interviews.
Results
We present findings under two subsections: 'Actors and their roles' and 'Contextual factors'. Table 2 contains selected quotes from key informant interviews as referenced within the text.
Actors and their roles
The various actors are identified from policy documents and their prescribed roles and interactions within Nigeria's decentralized health system (Figure 2) . Although DIVA is designed to strengthen evidence-informed planning at the LGA level, actors from the various tiers of government and the community have varying levels of influence on its implementation. Table 3 is a RACI-Matrix showing the expected roles of key actors in DIVA implementation derived from policy/programme documents. Although in practice, actors' roles overlap, we present the most dominant roles as identified in the policy and programme documents.
The typical line management structure at the LGA level in Kaduna and their various roles in DIVA are depicted as obtained from document analyses and interviews (Figure 3 ). It should be noted that in reality the management structure at this level is a strong matrix (Stuckenbruck 1979) such that the programme managers report to the PHC director as regards the 'functional' management of the LGA PHC department; however, the PHC director has limited influence on management of the vertical programmes under their purview. Rather they report directly to state programme managers at the SPHCDA in this regard.
State government
Whereas DIVA-based PHC reviews were introduced in all states in 2012/2013 by the NPHCDA, only Kaduna state has sustained implementation with support from UNICEF. This has been attributed to new transformational political leadership in the state. The newly elected governor (2015) applied a bottom-up approach to agenda setting for health. Results from the initial pilot were instrumental in convincing the new political leadership of the potential of DIVA to improve PHC in the state (Quotes: 1a-d).
Local government chairperson
This LGA (headed by an elected Chairperson) is presently directly responsible for PHC. Respondents from both LGAs indicated that the LGA leadership is the weakest link in PHC strengthening, given that the chairpersons are hardly involved in PHC planning nor do they commonly provide leadership and financial support for implementation. This leads to dependence of available development partners to implement health plans for the LGAs with implications on sustainability of DIVA (Quotes: 2a, 3a and b).
Local government health management teams
These act as the DIVA team. They conduct DIVA and are directly responsible for managing health facilities and programmes. They expressed frustration with carrying out their responsibilities due to failure of the various governments to lead, own and financially support implementation. Their coping mechanism is to skew implementation towards the interests of development partners who are ready to provide technical and financial support (Quote: 2b).
Development partners
Partners are ideally expected to support government plans and programmes. However, poor government leadership and ownership has made development partners central to PHC implementation in the LGAs. Consequently, they play dominant roles at the LGA level, prioritizing their own agenda as against supporting the local governments'(Quote: 2c).
Civil society organizations
Civil society can provide a link between the community and government. They have been identified as playing critical roles in the sustainability of DIVA, particularly advocacy. (Quote: 1e).
Community
Communities are the ultimate beneficiaries of health interventions; thus, they have been identified as very important in PHC planning as well as in the effective implementation of DIVA (NPHCDA 2012a; UNICEF; MSH 2012). However, in practice, there has been inadequate community engagement in planning and implementation LGA 1 We normally invite the LGA Chairman after doing the analysis. . .to inform him where we are, and the action we need him to take. . . Some implementing partners that are around, if they have funds, they normally help us but at the side of the [local] government, we find it very difficult to get funds Quote: 2f
LGA 1 The data are of good quality because we sometimes do DQA [Data Quality Assurance] to improve the data quality. Quote: 2g LGA 1
We bring out the agenda, we sit as a team then make decisions Quote: 2h LGA 1 . . .After we have known the issues, the causes of the problem, we start addressing the ones we can address at our own level [while] the ones that we need the chairman of the local government to address it, we have to tender it to him so that he can help us Quote: 2i
LGA 1 There is need to invite [the community], there are some areas we need traditional and community leaders to sensitize their community, if they are there during the bottleneck analysis, they will give us a lot of information. Quote: 2j
LGA 1 All key officers at the PHC department must be involved Quote: 2k LGA 1 It's really helping us!!!. . . before [DIVA] we hardly knew how to tackle some of the challenges we have in the health facilities but in the past two years [following] training in [DIVA] . . . when I go for any supervision, if I detect anything, I go back to my system to see how the facility will achieve good result based on the training we received Quote: 2l
LGA 1 There is a lot of improvement because when we do the bottle neck analysis, we normally bring out the issues at the grassroots level, after we have known the issues, the causes of the problem, then we start addressing the one we can address at our own level. . . and the one that we need the chairman of the Local Government to address, we have to tender it to him so that he can help us. Yes, I think that is the effect of the bottle neck Quote: 3a LGA 2
We don't find it easy when it comes to implementation. The challenge is that the LGA doesn't release any finance Quote: 3b LGA 2
And the LGA itself is never ready to sustain it. So, if UNICEF removes its hands. . .I don't see how it can continue; because the government of the day, I don't see how they can sustain this programme Quote: 3c
LGA 2 We tell [the district heads] what [DIVA] is all about and its importance. How, if implemented, it will go a long way in helping the community. Their role is to sensitize the community on the importance. . . if our people don't come to clinic, we can't get data. Quote: 3d LGA 2
The LGA chairman comes around during the Bottleneck Analysis but you know politicians, they make promises which they never fulfil, so when it comes to implementation, that's how it is Quote: 3e
LGA 2
One of the problems we are having in the LGA, a few years ago, one of the partners came in and while they were [exiting], we were trained on how to sustain the programme. But the problem is individually [as LGA health departments], we cannot generate such funds to sustain the programme Quote: 3f
LGA 2 The data we generate is okay. Because we obtain our data from the facilities. When we go for meetings, there are some particular areas they want us to look at. So, when they come, we have the data available.
(continued) processes as they were only informed but not invited to participate. Involvement of communities seems to largely be with respect to increasing demand for health services, rather than health system governance. For example, the community leadership is mobilized to sensitize women to attend ante-natal services at health facilities. However, they are never invited to participate in identifying barriers and planning strategies to improve utilization. Thus, key information on community perception of service availability and delivery is unavailable for user-oriented planning (Quotes: 2d and 3c). Table 4 interprets the total MUSIQ scores.
Contextual factors
LGA 1 (highest work plan implementing) scored 117.42 on the MUSIQ scale while LGA 2 (lowest work plan implementing) scored 104.67 both indicating that DIVA could be successful, but possible contextual barriers exist. Table 5 compares findings on each contextual factor between LGAs. A higher score (max ¼ 7) for a contextual factor indicates that the context is likely to be supportive for this feature. Lower scores (min ¼ 0) indicate an area for possible intervention. The Maximum possible total for each domain is also indicated. Figure 4 compares contextual domain subtotals as proportions of highest possible domain scores. The greatest contextual challenge in both
LGAs was with respect organizational factors, i.e. issues relating to LGA leadership and management even though external support accounted for the greatest contextual disparities.
Organization
Organization was seen to be the greatest challenge as both LGAs had low MUSIQ scores in three out of factors in this domain. Although DIVA is integrated into both LGAs' organizational system in that it supports health governance, LGA leadership support and organizational culture towards the initiative are poor. Both DIVA teams totally agreed on the MUSIQ questionnaire that there is no reward from the LGA for improvement in performance. Support for capacity building was reported to be poor. There is also very poor political commitment to implementing plans developed during DIVA processes. Generally, LGA leadership disposition towards DIVA seems passive. Consequently, health managers are forced to depend primarily on external support to implement plans (Quotes: 2e and 3d).
External environment
Using DIVA as the model for the PHC reviews resulted from higher level health system influence. The intervention was initiated by the Federal Government through the NPHCDA, adopted by the Kaduna SPHCDA with support from UNICEF but largely implemented by the LGAs. However, LGA 1 enjoys significantly more support from development partners than LGA 2 in implementing DIVA. Although UNICEF provides technical and financial support for DIVA (particularly the 'diagnose' phase), most other development partners are interested in planning, implementing and funding interventions within their scope of interest. Consequently, they tend to support only LGAs in which they operate and aspects of DIVA that suit their interests. External support seems to be critical to the success of the initiative given the weak support from the LGA leadership. However, such dependence on donors could lead to skewed implementation in favour of donor interests potentially resulting in deviations from the original design of DIVA especially with regards to integrated governance (Quotes: 2c, 3e and 1f).
DIVA support and capacity
Both
LGAs had similar challenges with respect to DIVA support and capacity even though LGA 1 had slightly higher MUSIQ scores than LGA 2 for the elements within this domain. Although data availability and harvesting from routine data system for DIVA is generally good, demand and use is of the data poor particularly in LGA 2.
LGA 2 identified the need to build DIVA capacity, especially at the service delivery level even though DIVA teams have been trained (Quotes: 2f, 3f and g).
DIVA team attributes
The MUSIQ scores on the elements of this domain suggest that both
LGAs have considerably strong DIVA teams, even though both teams considered the presence of a physician on the team as 'not applicable' hence the scores of '0' on this element. National PHC policy documents recognize the role of physicians in PHC as desirable but not mandatory (NPHCDA 2013c).
In both LGAs, the DIVA teams are led by the PHC directors, while the programme managers for the various interventions are team members thus bringing diversity of expertise. The Monitoring and Evaluation officers serve as assistant team leads and collate and We sit as a team in decision making. We sit as a team, the director is involved, even the LGA chairman is also involved. And almost all the deputy directors are involved Quote: 3i
LGA 2 Sometimes the [PHC director] involves the chairman. Once in a while, he comes to witness what is going on. . .Sometimes the meeting is chaired by the LGA chairman or in his absence, the director PHC. Quote: 3j
LGA 2 The traditional leaders, we hardly involve them. But it's one of the recommendations being given that we involve them Quote: 3k LGA 2
It's not easy. Because, even during the course of the planning, we only plan but we don't know how to source for the money to implement [strategies to address] the bottleneck identified. So that's why I say it's not easy because the government at times is not ready to put in their money. Most especially the local government. There are somethings we detect, which if they were implemented by the LGA, these bottlenecks will be reduced Quote: 3l
LGA analyse data from the various programmes. They are the most trained with respect to DIVA and coordinate QI processes. Decision making is a team effort (Quote: 2g and 3h). However, whereas LGA 2 occasionally involves the politically elected LGA chairperson in the planning process, LGA 1 seems less dependent on the political leadership and prefers to escalate only issues beyond the teams' immediate capacity to the LGA chairperson (Quotes: 2h and 3i). In both LGAs, the DIVA team has worked together as part of the LGA health management team prior to DIVA. Both LGAs recognize the need to expand the DIVA team to include other programme directors not directly involved in DIVA implementation, as well as representatives of the communities (Quotes: 2i, j and 3j).
Microsystem
Both LGAs reported strong leadership and motivation for the various programme teams and the health department leadership. The DIVA teams continue to work, even though frustrated by poor support (particularly financial) from the LGA political leadership. The motivation was stronger in LGA 1 most likely because of the higher donor support they receive (Quote: 3k). The outcome of evidenceinformed planning using DIVA seemed to also be a motivating factor in both LGAs. Team work in LGA 2 has been enhanced following the implementation of DIVA. The team cohesion could also enhance team motivation despite challenges (Quotes: 2k and 3l).
The DIVA teams recognize capacity gaps in the microsystem which need to be addressed. They opine that expanding training and Figure 2 . Decentralized health system governance in Nigeria The three-tier structure of government and how each relates to the Nigerian health system and the community. The LGA (through its health department) is the implementing level for PHC with strong interaction with the community. The state PHC Development Agency oversees the activities of the LGA health departments while the National PHC Development Agency interacts strongly with the State PHC Agency with respect to PHC policy thrusts. Interactions between PHC facilities and other levels of care are weak (mostly limited to referrals) involving more health workers and managers in DIVA will strengthen outcomes (Quotes: 3m and 2j).
Miscellaneous
DIVA was a top-down policy which the LGAs were directed to implement. There were no specific triggering factors (sudden transient shock or event) at the LGAs that necessitated implementation. Rather, the policy "trickled down" from higher tiers of government. The LGAs only complied particularly with support from development partners. Despite these, DIVA was considered beneficial in improving PHC planning in both LGAs (Quotes: 1g, 2k, l and 3n).
Discussion
Implementing DIVA as an improvement model for PHC planning and governance, though potentially effective, is constrained by contextual factors and actors. In both LGAs, experiences with DIVA were mostly similar. Both LGAs have strong DIVA team attributes (leadership, cohesion, motivation and capabilities), but this is not sufficient to independently ensure quality implementation. The most significant contrast is with respect to development partners' support which was more readily available to LGA 1 than LGA 2. This seems to account for the greater work plan implementation fidelity in LGA 1 (although both LGAs were sub-optimally implementing). Poor leadership and political support are the greatest implementation impediments in both LGAs as revealed by both key informant interviews and the MUSIQ scores under the 'Organization' domain. The DIVA teams compensate for this gap by leaning towards external support; however, this coping mechanism can potentially skew implementation towards donor interests.
Contrary to the core principles of DIVA and the Alma Alta Declaration which emphasize community participation in PHC Lowest Possible MUSIQ Score decision making, the users of services play peripheral roles in planning and governance. Commonly, policy makers and health managers fail to involve community structures actively in PHC planning processes . Rather, as our study reveals, they are used mostly to mobilize end users towards improving demand for services. However, there is evidence that community leadership and civil society can play more significant roles in governance (Abimbola et al. 2014; Nyonator et al. 2005) . The above findings are not unique to DIVA implementation in Kaduna. Studies of health interventions in other Nigerian states reveal similar contextual constraints (weak sub-national political will, overdependence on donors, poor subnational funding etc) (Okpani and Abimbola 2016) . Our findings are also comparable to experiences in other LMICs. Implementation of Ghana's Community-Based Health Planning and Services (a similar bottom up governance initiative) was found to be more effective with external resources (Nyonator et al. 2005) . Weak stewardship and coordination by the Ministry of Health constrained health planning in Kenya. However, in contrast to our study context, availability of reliable data for planning was also cited as a planning constraint in Kenya (Tsofa et al. 2016) . In decentralized systems, some degree of central oversight is essential for quality implementation largely due to weak local capacity for good governance as well as political constraints (Abimbola et al. 2014; Eboreime et al. 2015 Eboreime et al. , 2017 . However, health managers feel more incapacitated and demotivated when their efforts at improving quality of health interventions are frustrated by poor support from lower level political leadership to whom they are directly accountable. This was also the experience with district health managers in implementing decentralized health planning in India (Murthy 1998) . A similar study on an innovative district health planning model in Tanzania cited unreliable and untimely funding, including inadequate capacity of the district to generate local resources, as major contextual factors impeding quality implementation (Maluka et al. 2010) . However, central government's intervention and interest was viewed by district health managers as conflicting with district level priorities (Maluka et al. 2011) .
Funding was found to be the underlying cause of most implementation challenges. Nigeria currently disburses its national revenue such that 52.68% is allocated to the federal government; state governments receive 26.72%, while 20.60% is shared among the 774 local governments (Lukpata 2013) . Although this is not a direct reflection of health allocations, evidently the LGA, which is directly responsible for delivering basic health service to the populace, receives the least allocation of resources (federal and state governments are mostly responsible for tertiary and secondary facilities, while PHC is within the purview of LGAs) (FMOH 2004) . The federal government has minimal direct responsibility with respect to PHC (usually limited to procurement and distribution of vaccines and commodities for some special interventions like HIV/AIDS and malaria control). States and local governments take charge of salaries, training and capital costs. Transport costs for vaccines and health commodities are the shared responsibility of all tiers of government, with the local governments bearing the greater burden as they finance the transportation of commodities to health facilities (Eboreime et al. 2015) .
A general assumption in top-down policy implementation is that national priorities should automatically translate to subnational priorities. However, lessons from Nigeria and other similar contexts indicate that strong subnational political autonomy greatly impacts on implementation fidelity (Kolehmainen-Aitken 2004; Onoka et al. 2015; Eboreime et al. 2015; Sumah et al. 2016; Eboreime et al. 2017) . Consequently, sustained engagement of subnational political structures by policy initiators, interest groups and other stakeholders may improve implementation quality. However, previous evaluation of implementation within Nigeria's political governance reveals that the LGAs possess weak delivery systems for PHC, as they are inadequately financed and are easily susceptible to external influences (political and otherwise). Thus, political actors at this local level tend to prioritize initiatives with adequate political capital or incentives, as against improvement of socio-economic indices of the populace (Eboreime et al. 2017) .
The implications of this are far reaching with respect to ensuring equitable access to health services in line with UHC and the sustainable development goals. A previous study revealed the untoward effects of such lower level weakness on inequitable delivery of routine immunization services in Nigeria (Eboreime et al. 2015) . Whereas the central government may set a national health agenda with the collaboration of states, a weak delivery system at the lowest tier of government poses a threat to attainment of desired goals. Consequently, any effort to improve Nigeria's health system must be hinged on strengthening the PHC delivery system. Government, particularly at state and LGA levels, needs to show leadership, technical, political and sustainable financial commitment. Further, Table 5 . Comparative MUSIQ scores between two selected LGAs accountability mechanisms for political leadership at the LGA must be evolved. As highlighted by some respondents in this research, involving the communities and civil society in governance will go a long way in ensuring politicians are held accountable towards improving delivery systems at the LGAs. With the current restructuring of the state health system towards PHCUOR, it is expected that the state government through the SPHCDA will take up all PHC responsibilities from the LGA (NPHCDA 2013a; Eboreime et al. 2017 ). This will potentially improve political will by shifting accountability from the LGA chairpersons to the SPHCDA. The LGA chairperson will tend towards the 'informed' role on the RACI matrix following completion of the reforms.
Strengths and limitations
Methodologically, our study found MUSIQ useful in identifying contextual constraints in this LGA-centred QI initiative in Nigeria. However, the model was unable to highlight the relative impact of each contextual factor on implementation outcomes. MUSIQ composite scores were not able to explain the magnitude of disparities in implementation between both LGAs. Nevertheless, the key informant interviews and the RACI matrix compensated for this deficit by revealing that some contextual factors (such as funding and political will) were greater determinants of successful implementation than others. Further, Walt and Gilson health policy analysis framework used in this study was helpful in integrating and explaining findings from the methods employed.
Stakeholder analysis typically explores issues of position, power and interests of actors. The use of a responsibility assignment matrix (such as RACI) in this study is unable to explore these issues. Given that this paper focuses on roles and responsibilities of actors in DIVA implementation, RACI was used here to identify the prescribed roles of actors as a preamble to exploring how these actors performed these roles (which are explored by the key informant interviews). Further exploration of power dynamics and interactions of stakeholders, using tools such as Social Network Analysis, are upcoming in this series of studies on implementation and sustainability of DIVA in Nigeria. In these future analyses, the prescribed vis-a-vis practiced roles may be able to indicate how power and interests operate and become manifest at the local level.
Purposively selecting two LGAs based on work plan implementation may be considered a selection bias given that intrinsic differences may explain these implementation outcome disparities. For example, the capital of LGA 1 is more proximately located to the state capital than LGA 2 which may account for the greater partner support it receives. However, based on the theoretical framework of this study, these factors are also contextual even though not included in MUSIQ. Thus, our triangulation of methods (MUSIQ, key informant interviews and document analyses) served to interpret the how these affect implementation. Given also that organizational structure of all LGAs in Kaduna are fundamentally the same, findings and recommendations from this study can help improve implementation across other
LGAs in Kaduna as well as guide scale up of DIVA to other states.
The non-availability of LGA chairpersons for interview potentially means that their key political perspectives cannot be fully appraised. Although we consider that the views of the LGA officers interviewed (who work closely with the chairpersons) can compensate for this gap, future studies exploring power dynamics of stakeholders in sustaining DIVA implementation should provide more political perspectives in line with the Walt and Gilson framework.
Conclusions
This paper is part of a series of studies which together form the first attempt at assessing the implementation of DIVA in Nigeria since its commencement in 2012. Our findings have far reaching implications for national policy in Nigeria and other LMICs with LGA with respect to contextual domains. The greatest contextual challenge in both LGAs was with respect organizational factors, i.e. issues relating to LGA leadership and management even though external support accounted for the greatest contextual disparities comparable decentralized governance. First, even though PHC is the cornerstone of Nigeria's health system, the delivery system at the LGA is weak as is common in many LMICs. PHC planning and/or implementation of plans is therefore almost non-existent in the absence of external support from development partners. Consequently, even though higher levels of government may set visionary goals for PHC, at the implementation level, interventions are potentially skewed towards donor interests. Secondly, the present structure of the LGA system does not allow for effectiveness of PHC interventions given the weak managerial capacity and political accountability at that level. It is hoped that ongoing reforms aimed at integrating PHC governance at the state level under the SPHCDAs will improve delivery systems (Eboreime et al. 2017) . Ultimately, political will remains a key determinant should quality implementation be expected. Thus, the role of civil society in advocating for more responsible and accountable political governance, especially as relates to health, is essential in decentralized LMIC contexts.
And finally, to cite the World Report on Health Policy and Systems Research, 'the evidence-to-policy field remains quite fragmented. Although some practitioners operate primarily within a traditional knowledge-translation paradigm, others come from the research communication field, still others focus on evidence synthesis and some are more interested in studying how evidence, among other factors, affects policy development and implementation' (WHO 2017). Overall, this series of studies weighs the role of evidence in real-time policy interventions.
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